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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This paper studies collective decision making in the context of a project selection 
model.  We derive the optimal decision architecture when marginal decision costs 
are present, and investigate the circumstances under which the hierarchy and 
polyarchy exist as optimal sequential architectures.  Our analysis extends previous 
results on optimal committee decision-making to a sequential setting, and further 
demonstrates the fragility of the hierarchy and polyarchy as optimal architectures. 
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1. Introduction 
In many economic organizations, matters of strategic importance are often decided 
collectively by a team of fallible decision-makers, either in a committee setting where a pre-
determined majority rule applies, or sequentially in a hierarchy where full consensus is required 
for a decision to be implemented.  In some cases, a proposal or project is accepted as soon as it 
receives the support of one decision-maker.  Such a decision architecture is sometimes referred 
to as a polyarchy.  Even when decision-makers are well-intentioned and share the same 
objectives, mistakes are made if they are limited by the information they have access to, or if 
they are limited in their ability to process and evaluate information (Stiglitz, 2002). 
Over the past two decades, a large literature has studied various aspects of collective 
decision-making in a large variety of contexts; these studies include Klevorick and Rothschild 
(1979), Nitzan and Paroush (1980, 1982, 1984, 1985), Klevorick, Rothschild and Winship 
(1984), Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986, 1988), Gradstein, Nitzan and Paroush (1990), Sah (1990, 
1991), Koh (1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1994a, 1994b), Pete, Pattipati, Kleinman (1993), Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996), Berg and Paroush (1998), Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997, 1998, 2001) 
and Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2001).  Recently, the strategic aspects of collective decision-
making in the committee setting have been studied by Feddersen and Pesedorfer (1998), Dekel 
and Piccione (2000), Li, Rosen and Suen (2001),  Persico (2002), and others.  
In this paper, I study the collective-decision problem in the context of a project 
selection model, where a team of decision-makers have to decide whether to accept or reject 
projects.  My objective is two-fold. First, I solve for the optimal decision architecture when 
marginal decision costs are present and decision-makers are homogeneous in their expertise.  I 
show that the optimal sequential architecture is a pair of sequential majority rules, which 
demarcates the ranges within which projects are accepted, rejected, or where an additional 
evaluation is called for.  The analysis, presented in Section 3, extends the main result of Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (1997) –  on the optimal majority rule in committee decision making – to a 
sequential setting where marginal decision costs are positive.  
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 With positive marginal decision costs, there are many possible decision architectures, 
besides the hierarchy and polyarchy.  These two architectures have attracted considerable 
attention in the literature  (see Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986, 1988), Sah (1991), Koh (1992a, 
1992b, 1994) and Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2001)).  My second objective in this paper is to 
investigate the circumstances under which the hierarchy and the polyarchy emerge as optimal 
sequential architectures.   In a hierarchy, a project is rejected and evaluation ends if one 
decision-maker rejects the project. A project is only accepted if every decision-maker approves 
of the project. Decision-making authority is thus centralized in a hierarchy.  By contrast, in a 
polyarchy, a team of decision-makers can undertake projects independently of each other.  A 
project will be given further chances within the organization if it is turned down, and will be 
accepted as soon as it receives the support of one decision-maker.  In this sense, decision-
making authority is more decentralized in a polyarchy. 
Although the hierarchy and the polyarchy are optimal sequential architectures for 
specific configurations of the quality of the investment environment and expertise of the 
decision makers, we show that the robustness of these two specific architectures is sensitive to 
perturbations in the environment.  Furthermore, in the context of the optimal sequential 
decision architecture, the feasible optimal size of the hierarchy and polyarchy also turns out to 
be the minimum size of the organization.  Therefore, under the general setting investigated in 
this paper, the application of either the hierarchical and polyarchical architecture to 
organizational decision-making will usually be sub-optimal.  Our results, presented in Section 
4, complement the analysis in Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2001), which also examined the 
robustness of these two architectures.   
The focus on marginal decision costs in this paper is motivated by the observation that 
most organizations operate at full managerial capacity, in the sense all the available managerial 
resources are fully deployed in making production and investment decisions at each point in 
time. With a fixed pool of managerial expertise within an organization, managerial tasks often 
have to be prioritized and for each task taken up by a group of decision-makers, another task 
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will only be attended to later.  In order to utilize managerial time and expertise optimally, the 
allocation of managerial expertise at each point in time should recognize the marginal benefit of 
further deliberation on a decision versus the opportunity costs to the organization of doing so.  
Besides the additional resources that would be deployed to continue the evaluation before a 
decision is made on acceptance or rejection, the opportunity costs also include the impact of 
potential delay in managerial attention on other projects, as well as potential monetary loss to 
the organization, as in the case when first-mover advantage matters in making investment 
decisions (if the project under review is also being considered for adoption by competitors).  
Other papers that have also considered marginal decision costs in collective decision-making 
include Nitzan and Paroush (1985) and Gradstein, Nitzan and Paroush (1990).  Clearly, if 
marginal decision costs are absent, there is no necessity to engage in sequential review.  The 
optimal decision architecture is simply a committee where all decision-makers evaluate a 
project simultaneously.  The decision to accept or reject a project will be based on a super-
majority rule, as shown in Sah (1990), and generalized in Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997).    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the project selection 
model.  The analysis of the optimal sequential architecture is presented in Section 3. Next, in 
Section 4, we examine the robustness of the hierarchy and polyarchy as optimal sequential 
architectures.  Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2.   The Model 
Consider an economic organization of n members whose objective is to maximize a 
common utility function associated with the selection of projects for investment.  There are two 
types of projects; good (1) projects and bad (0) projects. Let s denote the state of a project; s= 1 
and s = 0 are the two possible states of nature.  For each project, there are two possibilities of 
making a correct decision: (1|1) invest in a good project, and (0|0) reject a bad project.  There 
are also two possibilities of making an incorrect decision: (1|0) invest in a bad project, and (0|1) 
reject a good project.   
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The expected payoff associated with the approval (1) of a good project is B(1|1)  while 
the expected payoff associated with the rejection (0) of a bad project is B(0|0).  Similarly, the 
expected payoff associated with the rejection of a good project is B(0|1), while the expected 
payoff of accepting a bad project is B(1|0). 1   We require B(1|1) > B(0|0), B(1|1) > B(1|0) and 
B(0|0) ≥  B(0|1), so that there is an optimal action associated with each type of project.   Let    
B(1) = B(1|1) – B(0|1) be the net expected payoff when si = 1, and B(0) = B(0|0) – B(1|0) be the 
net expected payoff when si = 0.  For simplicity, suppose that the a priori probability that a 
project is good  is known and is fixed at α, where 0 < α < 1.  The expected project payoffs are 
summarized in Tables 1 below.  
  
                        Table 1:  The Expected Payoffs of Projects 
  Project Quality 
  Good   Bad   
Accept    B(1|1)   B(1|0)   
Action  
Reject B(0|1)   B(0|0)   
 
The decision-makers can discriminate between good projects and bad ones, but only 
imperfectly.  They vote independently to approve or reject projects, and are homogeneous in 
their decision-making expertise.2  Specifically, the expertise of decision makers are represented 
as follows: p1 is the probability that he will approve a good project, and p0 that he will reject a 
bad project.  Therefore, the probabilities (1 – p1) and (1 – p0) are the Type-I (reject a good 
project) and Type-II (accept a bad project) errors committed in the decision process.  Decision-
making expertise is imperfect in the sense that p1 < 1,  p0 > 0 and p1 > (1 – p0), i.e. a manager is 
                                                 
1   In this formulation of the decision problem, the actual utility payoff from a project is still uncertain, 
although the expected payoffs are known, contingent on the nature of the project (good or bad) and the 
action taken by the organization (accept or reject).   
2   In a more general setting, we could allow for decision-makers to differ in their decision-making 
expertise. This is studied in Koh (2003). 
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more likely to accept a good project than a mediocre project.  The expertise of the decision 
makers are summarized in Table 2 below.  
 
                      Table 2:  The Expertise of Decision-Makers  
  Project Quality 
  Good   Bad  
Accept  p1 (1 – p0) 
Action   
Reject (1 – p1) p0 
  
 
Project evaluation takes place sequentially and each evaluation incurs a constant 
marginal decision cost of C.  When marginal decision costs are absent, as may be the case when 
managerial expertise are not fully deployed within the organization or when the organization 
can access additional resources at no cost, it is easy to see that the optimal decision rule takes 
the form of a super-majority rule with participation by all the decision-makers.  When marginal 
decision costs are positive, the optimal sequential architecture includes the option to make the 
decision earlier, as the expected benefits of further deliberation may be out-weighed by the 
costs of doing so. 
 
3. The Optimal Sequential Decision Architecture 
The objective of the economic organization is to determine the optimal sequential 
decision architecture. Let  ( )≤k n denote the number of evaluations that the project has 
undergone. Denote zi = 0 (rejection) or 1 (acceptance) as the recommendation of the ith 
decision-maker.  We say that the decision process is in state Xk  at stage k if there are Xk  votes 
to accept the project (and k − Xk  votes to reject).  The decision at stage k to accept the project, 
reject the project, or to proceed for another review, depends on Xk.  The optimal decision rule is 
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to end the evaluation process if the expected gain in payoff from another evaluation is less than 
the cost of doing so.   
Let ( )k kP X denote the posterior probability that a project under review is a good project 
after k evaluations with Xk, favorable reviews, where 1== ∑ kk iiX z .  Therefore, zi is a Bernoulli 
random variable, where p1 is the probability that iz  = 1 when the project is good, and p0 is the 
probability that  iz  = 0 when the project is bad.  The Bayesian updating of ( )k kP X  is given by: 
  
[ ]11 1 0
( )( 1)
( ) 1 ( ) (1 )
k k
k k
k k k k
P X pP X
P X p P X p+
+ = + − −                       (1) 
[ ]11 1 0
( )(1 )( )
( )(1 ) 1 ( )
k k
k k
k k k k
P X pP X
P X p P X p+
−= − + −  
so that through recursion, we obtain 
1 1
1 1 0 0
(1 )( )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
X k Xk k
k k k X k Xk kX Xk k
p pP X
p p p p
α
α α
−
− −
−=
− + − −
                  (2) 
Let ( ( ))a k kR P X , ( ( ))r k kR P X  and ( ( ))c k kR P X  denote, respectively, the conditional expected 
project payoff if, after k evaluations with kX  positive reviews, the organization’s decision is to 
accept the project, reject the project, or proceed for another review.  We have: 
[ ]( ( )) ( ) (1|1) 1 ( ) (1| 0)a k k k k k kR P X P X B P X B= + −                                (3) 
[ ]( ( )) ( ) (0 |1) 1 ( ) (0 | 0)r k k k k k kR P X P X B P X B= + −  
Define the value function ( ( ), )k kV P X k  where 
{ }( ( ), ) Max ( ( )), ( ( )), ( ( ), )k k a k k r k k c k kV P X k R P X R P X R P X k≡                (4) 
The value function ( ( ), )k kV P X k  describes the maximum conditional expected project payoff 
of the project after k evaluations with kX  positive reviews.  There are two possible events at the 
( 1)th+k  review; namely, manager (k+1) disapproves of the project (so that 1+kz = 0) or 
approves the project (so that 1+kz = 1).  Since ( )k kP X provides the Bayesian-updated probability 
that the project under consideration is a good project, for a given history of reviews up to stage 
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k, the conditional probabilities of observing 1+kz = 0 or 1 at the ( 1)th+k  review are given by, 
respectively,                                                                                                                               
[ ]1 0(1| ( )) ( ) 1 ( ) (1 )k k k k k kH P X P X p P X p= + − −                         (5)                                  
[ ]1 0(0 | ( )) ( )(1 ) 1 ( )k k k k k kH P X P X p P X p= − + −   
We can obtain a sequence of recursive equations for ( ( ), )k kV P X k  as follows:    (6) 
          1 1
( ( ), ) ( ( 1), 1) (1| ( )) ( ( ), 1) (0 | ( ))c k k k k k k k k k kR P X k V P X k H P X V P X k H P X C+ +≡ + + + + −  
We first prove the following results on the optimal decision rule for k ≤  n−1.  The optimal 
decision rule for k = n  is a supermajority rule, and will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Proposition 13:  The optimal evaluation policy consists of a pair of probability thresholds 
{ },L Uk kq q , k = 1, 2 …, n, where Lkq  is increasing in k, and  Ukq  is decreasing in k.  
[a] If Lkq  < )( kk XP < Ukq ; the evaluation process continues; 
[b] If )( kk XP <
L
kq , the project should be rejected and evaluation ends; 
[c] If )( kk XP >
U
kq , the project should be accepted and evaluation ends.  
 
Corresponding to the optimal evaluation policy in Proposition 1 is an equivalent optimal 
decision architecture.  
 
Proposition 2:  The optimal decision architecture consists of a pair of sequential majority rules 
{ },L Uk kX X , k = 1, 2 …, n–1.  
[a] If LkX  < kX < UkX ; an additional evaluation is requested; 
[b] if kX <
L
kX , the project should be rejected and evaluation ends; 
[c] If kX >
U
kX , the project should be accepted and evaluation ends. 
                                                 
3  The proofs are provided in the Appendix.   
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The optimal evaluation policy and the optimal decision architecture are related as follows. 
Since ( )L Lk k kP X q≅  and ( )U Uk k kP X q≅  (the approximation is due to the integer nature of LkX  
and UkX ), it is straightforward to derive, for k ≤  n−1, 
1Min ln ,  
1
U
U k
k U
k
qX k k
q
δ µγ δ
  = − +  + −          
(7)
        
     
 
1Max ln ,  0
1
L
L k
k L
k
qX k
q
δ µγ δ
  = − +  + −   
                                                                  
where  
        ln
1
αµ α≡ − ,  
1
0
ln
1
p
p
γ ≡ −  
and  0
1
ln
1
p
p
δ ≡ −                          
(8)
 
4
  
From (7), it is straightforward to show that there exists 
Uk  and 
Lk  such that UkX  =  k  for k  ≤  
Uk , and LkX  =  0 for k ≤  Lk :    
 1 ln
1
U
UU k
U
Uk
q
k
q
µγ
  = − + −  
,   1 ln
1
L
LL k
L
Lk
q
k
q
µδ
  = − −  
     (9)
        
      
Hence, for k < Uk , the decision choices for the project under evaluation are either to proceed 
for further evaluation or to reject the project.  Similarly, for k < Lk , the decision choices are to 
proceed for further evaluation or accept the project.  Thus, for an organization of size n, 
{ }* Min ,  L Uk k k≡ denotes the minimum number of evaluations that must be undertaken.  Since 
no decision on acceptance or rejection should be made when k  < *k , the first *k  evaluations 
forms an initial review of the project, and it does not matter if the first *k evaluations are 
carried out simultaneously or sequentially.  In fact, if delay in selecting a project is costly, so 
that marginal decision costs is increasing with time taken to evaluate a project, it would be 
preferable for the first-stage of the evaluation process to be structured as a committee review by 
                                                 
4   Note that γ  > 0, δ  > 0, and µ  > ( < ) 0 depending on whether α  >  ( < ) 0.5. 
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*k  decision-makers (simultaneously).   From the second stage of the evaluation onwards, the 
evaluation of the project will be conducted sequentially. 
Although closed-form solutions are generally not available for the sequential majority 
rules { },L Uk kX X , they can derived numerically by applying the following set of recursive rules. 
 
Proposition 3: [a]   For k > Lk ,   1 1
L L L
k k kX X Xβ ++ < < + ;  
                         [b]   For k > Uk ,   β+<< + UkUkUk XXX 1    where β ≡ δδ γ+ < 1.     
 
Figure 1 below provides an illustration of the optimal sequential decision architecture. 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1     
----------------------------------------- 
 
The magnitude of the marginal decision cost has an important impact on the set of 
probability thresholds { },L Uk kq q .  Firstly, if the marginal decision cost C becomes larger, the 
probability range, given by ( )U Lk kq q− , will become narrower.  In other words, the scope for 
continuing with further project evaluation, as measured by the difference ( )U Lk kX X− , will be 
smaller, so that fewer evaluations will be undertaken for each project, on average.  In the limit, 
when marginal decision costs are prohibitive, no evaluations will be undertaken.  Conversely, if 
the marginal decision cost falls, the scope for further project evaluation is increased.  In the 
limit, when marginal decision cost is zero, the optimal decision rule is to for the project to 
undergo n reviews, and then apply a super-majority rule to consider acceptance or rejection.   In 
fact, in this case, the decision-makers should evaluate the project simultaneously, as there is no 
advantage to sequentially reviewing the project.  Of course, even if there is no marginal 
decision cost, there are still fixed costs involved in engaging a team of n decision-makers.  
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Thus, the optimal size of the decision team will still be finite and it should be selected to 
maximize expected net payoff per project.  
When marginal decision costs are positive, Proposition 2 indicates that the optimal 
decision architectures is a pair of sequential majority rules, which defines the range where 
projects are accepted, rejected or where an additional evaluation is called for.  These results are 
related to the analysis in Nitzan and Paroush (1985), which also discusses the optimality of 
similar sequential decision rules in a different setting.  
The analysis here also extends the main result of Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997) to a 
sequential setting for the case of homogenous decision-makers possessing identical expertise.  
In Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997), decisions are made in a fixed-size committee, and since there 
are no marginal decision costs, all the decision-makers participate in reviewing the project and 
voting simultaneously.  By contrast, in the analysis presented in this paper, project evaluation is 
carried out sequentially, and it is only in the case when all the n managers have reviewed the 
project, that our results converge to those of Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997).   
 
4. The Optimality of Hierarchy and Polyarchy Architectures 
In this section, we investigate the conditions under which the optimal sequential 
decision architecture is either a hierarchy (where all decision-makers must approve the project 
before it is accepted) or a polyarchy (where a project is accepted as soon as one decision-maker 
approves it, and is only rejected if all the decision-makers turn it down).   
First, let us derive the optimal decision rule when a project has reached the maximum 
number of evaluations, i.e. when all the n decision-makers have reviewed the project.  The 
decision to accept or reject the project is based on whether ( , )a nR X n  > ( < ) ( , )r nR X n , which 
translates into the equivalent condition that ( )n nP X  >  ( < )  
(0)
(0) (1)
B
B B
φ ≡ + .  Let 
*
nX  solve 
*( )n nP X  = φ , so that if nX  >  ( < ) *nX , the optimal decision rule is to accept (reject) the 
project.  Using the definition of ( )k kP X in (2),  
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*
n
nX δ θ µγ δ
− −= +  
,   (1)ln
(0)
B
B
θ ≡                                                                       (10)  
In order that the sequential decision architecture is not trivial, we require that  0  < *nX  < n.   It 
is then straightforward to prove the following result:
  
 
Proposition 4: [a]  When  0θ µ+ > , the minimum size of the organization is Pn θ µδ
+≡  
with *nX  = 0; otherwise, it is preferable to always accept projects. [b] When 0θ µ+ < , the 
minimum size of the  organization is Hn
θ µ
γ
+≡ −   with *nX  = Hn ;  otherwise, it is preferable 
to always reject projects. 
 
  In the model, ( )θ µ+  is a measure of the quality of the investment environment, while 
γ  and δ  are measures of the decision-makers’ expertise to select good projects and bad 
projects, respectively.   In the absence of any evaluation, the optimal decision is clearly to 
accept a project if  0θ µ+ > , reject it if 0θ µ+ < , and be indifferent between accepting and 
rejecting the project if 0θ µ+ = .  Therefore, 0θ µ+ >  describes an above-average investment 
environment, while 0θ µ+ < describes a mediocre environment.  It follows that if project 
evaluation is to generate information of sufficient value – in the sense that neither the “accept” 
nor “reject” decision is the preferred default choice –  the decision team must be of a minimum 
size, as indicated by Proposition 4.   
When the investment environment is above-average, the optimal decision architecture 
described in Proposition 4a is a polyarchy of size ( ) /θ µ δ+ .  Similarly, when the investment 
environment is mediocre, the decision architecture described in Proposition 4b is a hierarchy of 
size ( ) /θ µ γ− + .  The optimality of either decision architecture is clearly sensitive to 
perturbations in the investment environment and the expertise of the decision-makers.  An 
improvement in decision-making expertise, due to an increase in p1 or an increase in 0p  (or 
both) reduces the minimum organizational size, as γ  and δ  are raised. Similarly, variations in 
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the quality of the investment environment, as measured by ( )θ µ+ , affect the minimum 
organizational size and therefore, the optimality of the hierarchy and polyarchy architectures.   
Suppose that the size of the decision team is reduced below the minimum level required 
for informative evaluation (due to, say, budgetary constraints), it follows from Proposition 4 
that the hierarchy architecture, if maintained, is dominated by not considering any investment at 
all.  Similarly, the polyarchy architecture, if maintained, is dominated by simply accepting all 
projects. Conversely, if the decision team is enlarged beyond the minimum size, then the 
optimal sequential architecture is clearly no longer a hierarchy or polyarchy, but a pair of 
sequential majority rules, as described in Proposition 2.  Clearly, then, the conditions under 
which the hierarchy and polyarchy can exist as optimal architectures are very stringent; both 
structures are optimal decision architectures only when the organizational size is fixed at the 
minimum level stated in Proposition 4. Formally, with marginal decision costs of C per 
evaluation, the expected net payoff of accepting a project in a hierarchy (after Hn  evaluations) 
must be greater than simply rejecting it without any evaluation.  In other words, we require that 
(1|1) 1 (1| 0) + − − H H HP B P B n C  > (0 |1) (1 ) (0 | 0)α α+ −B B   (11) 
where 1
1 0(1 )(1 )
α
α α= + − −
H
H H
n
H
n n
pP
p p
.  Similarly, for a polyarchy, the expected net payoff 
from rejecting a project (after Pn  evaluations) must be greater than simply accepting it without 
any review:  
(0 |1) 1 (0 | 0) + − − P P PP B P B n C  > (1|1) (1 ) (1| 0)α α+ −B B                (12) 
where 1
1 0(1 )(1 )
α
α α= + − −
P
P P
n
p
n n
pP
p p
.  However, even if the conditions in (11) and (12) hold for 
the hierarchy and polyarchy, respectively, they can be easily dominated by a larger organization 
if these larger organizations generate a higher expected payoff per project.   
 The analysis presented in this section is related to that in Ben-Yashar and Nitzan 
(2001), which also examined the optimality of the hierarchy and polyarchy architectures.  In 
their paper, Ben-Yashar and Nitzan proposed a size robustness measure, defined as the 
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maximal permissible change in the size of the organization that does not alter the optimal 
architecture.  Applying this measure to the hierarchy and polyarchy, they found that the size 
robustness measure is very small for both the hierarchy and polyarchy, and similarly concluded 
that these two architectures are, in general, sub-optimal organizational structures. 
 
5. Summary and Discussion   
This paper studies optimal collective decision-making in a sequential setting. Decision 
makers have a common objective to maximize the expected project payoffs, and must decide 
whether to accept or reject the project under consideration.  The optimal sequential decision 
architecture, presented in Proposition 2, is a pair of sequential majority rules { },L Uk kX X .  We 
show, in Proposition 4, that while the hierarchy or the polyarchy could exist as an optimal 
sequential architecture, the conditions under which this can occur are stringent.  
While our analysis considers constant marginal decision costs, it can be extended to the 
case where the marginal decision cost C  is not constant, but increases with the stage of 
evaluation.  Such a situation may arise in the case where senior managers hold greater 
responsibilities and face heavier demands on their time, or when further delay in decision-
making may adversely affect the organization’s chances of investing in the project as well as 
the eventual project payoff (as would be the case when there is competition to invest in the 
project).   It is easy to see that impact of increasing marginal decision costs as evaluation 
progresses will lead to a tighter range for requesting an additional evaluation; i.e. the difference 
( )−U Lk kX X  will be smaller, k ≤  n−1.  Thus, the likelihood of proceeding for an additional 
evaluation is reduced, compared with the case when marginal decision costs are constant.  In 
general, the impact of rising marginal decision cost is to reduce the optimal organizational size 
and the expected number of evaluations for a project.  The overall profitability of the 
organization may suffer as a greater number of good projects are rejected, and bad projects 
accepted, when decisions on acceptance and rejection are made earlier. 
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With rising marginal decision costs, the minimum feasible size of an organization – 
either as a hierarchy or a polyarchy – will likely be reduced as well.  Thus, under the rare 
circumstances when they emerge as optimal architectures, the hierarchy and polyarchy will 
apply only to smaller organizations.  In general, large hierarchies and polyarchies can almost 
always improve organizational efficiency by altering their architecture and adopting less 
extreme sequential majority rules in the decision-making process. 
 
Appendix   
To derive the optimal evaluation policy in Proposition 1, we require the following lemmas.  
 
Lemma 1:  [a] ( , ) ( , 1)V p k V p k≥ + ; [b] ( , ) ( , 1)c cR p k R p k≥ +  k = 1,  …, n–1 and p ∈ [0, 1].  
Lemma 2:  ( , )V p k  and ( , )cR p k  are convex in p;   k = 1, …, n–1 and p ∈ [0, 1]. 
 
Lemma 1 and 2 are well-known results in the optimal stopping rule literature (see Astrom 
(1970), DeGroot (1970) or Bertekas (1987)).  We present the proofs here for completeness.    
 
Proof of Lemma 1:  We first show if ( , )V p k  ≥  ( , 1)V p k +  is true for some k, then 
( , 1)V p k −  ≥  ( , )V p k .  Suppose ( , )V p k  ≥  ( , 1)V p k + , then 1( , 1)c kR p k− −   =  [ ]( , )kE V p k  
> [ ]( , 1)kE V p k + = ( , )c kR p k . Thus, 1( , 1)kV p k− −  =  { }1 1 1Max ( ), ( ), ( , 1)a k r k c kR p R p R p k− − − −  
≥  { }1 1 1Max ( ), ( ), ( , )a k r k c kR p R p R p k− − −  =  1( , )kV p k− . Next, we show that ( , 1)−V p n ≥  
( , )V p n . Since the maximum number of evaluations is n, 1( , 1)− −nV p n  = 
{ }1 1 1Max ( ), ( ), ( , 1)− − − −a n r n c nR p R p R p n   ≥   { }1 1Max ( ), ( )− −a n r nR p R p  = 1( , )−nV p n .     Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2:  First, we can write  ( , ) (1| ) (0 | )= + −c k k k k kR p k U p U p C  where   
1(1| ) , 1 (1| )
(1| )
 ≡ +  
k
k k k
k
p pU p V k H p
H p
, 1(1 )(0 | ) , 1 (0 | )
(0 | )
 −≡ +  
k
k k k
k
p pU p V k H p
H p
. The 
expressions (1| )H p and (0 | )H p are defined in (5).    To show the convexity of ( , )cR p k  in p, 
 k = 1, 2…, n–1 and p ∈ [0, 1], it is sufficient to show that (1| )kU p and (0 | )kU p  are convex  
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in p.  To prove the convexity of (1| )kU p  in p, we must show for λ ∈ [0, 1], and  pa and               
pb ∈ [0, 1], (1| ) (1 ) (1| ) λ λ+ −k a k bU p U p ≥ (1| (1 ) )λ λ+ −k a bU p p .   For (1| )kU p ,   
    1(1| ) , 1
(1| ) (1 ) (1| ) (1| )
λ
λ λ
   +  + −   
a a
a b a
H p p p
V k
H p H p H p
                                                                                         
+ 1
(1 ) (1| )
, 1
(1| ) (1 ) (1| ) (1| )
λ
λ λ
   − +  + −   
b b
a b b
H p p p
V k
H p H p H p
1( (1 ) ) , 1
(1| ) (1 ) (1| )
a b
a b
p p pV k
H p H p
λ λ
λ λ
 + −≥ + + − 
 
Hence, (1| )kU p  is convex in p if ( , 1)V p k +  is convex in p. The convexity of (0 | )kU p  can be 
proven similarly.  Since ( , )c kR p k = (1| )k kU p  + (0 | )k kU p  −  C, this implies that ( , )cR p k is 
convex in p if ( , 1)V p k +  is convex in p.  Let’s suppose ( , )cR p k is convex in p; it follows then 
that since ( , )V p k is the maximum of three convex functions, ( , )V p k  is also convex in p. 
Hence, the convexity of ( , 1)V p k +  in p implies the convexity of ( , )V p k  in p, k = 1, 2…, n–1.  
Finally, ( , )V p n is convex is p since it is the maximum of two linear functions, ( )aR p  and 
( )rR p .Therefore, ( , 1)V p n − is convex in p.                               Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:   The proof utilizes Lemmas 1 and 2.  First, as p tends to 1, ( , )cR p k  
tends to  B(1|1) – C ; similarly, as p tends to 0, ( , )cR p k  tends to  B(0|0) – C ,  k = 1, …, n.  
From Lemma 2, ( , 1)cR p k −  ≥  ( , )cR p k  so that if the evaluation reaches (n−1)th stage,  
( , 1)cR nφ −  = ( )aR φ  = ( )rR φ , where  [ ](0) / (0) (1)B B Bφ ≡ + .  Since ( )aR p  and ( )rR p  are 
linear, and ( , )cR p k  is convex in p,  with (1, )cR k  > ( )aR φ  = ( )rR φ  and (0, )cR k  > ( )aR φ  = 
( )rR φ , it is easy to verify that the function ( , 1)cR p n −  intersects the function 
{ }Max ( ), ( )a rR p R p  at two points, ( )1 1, ( )U Un a nq R q− −  and ( )1 1, ( )L Ln r nq R q− −   so that 1( , 1)Uc nR q n− −  
= 1( )
U
a nR q −  and 1( , 1)
L
c nR q n− −   =  1( )Lr nR q − , and  1Lnq −  <  φ   < 1Unq − .   Next, utilizing Lemma 1, 
it follows that the probability range ( Lkq ,
U
kq ) narrows as k increases.  Since ( , 1)cR p k −  ≥  
( , )cR p k  for  p ≠ 0 or 1, it follows that Lkq is increasing in p and Ukq  is decreasing in p.  Q.E.D. 
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We illustrate the relationship between ( , )kV p k , ( , )cR p k , ( )aR p and ( )rR p  in Figure 2. 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2     
----------------------------------------- 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:   
[a] To prove that 1 1
L L L
k k kX X Xβ ++ < < + for k = 1, …, n−1, we first note from Proposition 1 
that Lkq < 
L
kq 1+ ; hence, )( Lkk XP < )( 11 Lkk XP ++ . Using the definition of )( kk XP , it is routine to 
show that Lk
L
k XX 1+<+ β . Next, to show that 1 1L Lk kX X+ < + , suppose that Lkk XX 1 1 +≤+ .  
This implies that 1( ( 1), 1)k kV P X k+ + +  = 1( ( 1))r k kR P X+ +  and 1( ( ), 1)k kV P X k+ +  = 
1( ( ))r k kR P X+ . In turn, this implies, using (5) and (6) to take conditional expectation, that 
( ( ), )c k kR P X k  = ( ( ))r k kR P X . Therefore, ( ( ), )k kV P X k ) = ( ( ))r k kR P X .  Since this is true for 
kX  < 
L
kX  it follows that since we assume 11   Lk kX X ++ ≤  that  kX +1 ≤ 11 1 +<+ +LkLk XX .    
[b]  Next, to prove that for k = 1, …, n−1, β+<< + UkUkUk XXX 1 . Again, we note from 
Proposition 1 that Ukq is decreasing, so that  
U
kq > 
U
kq 1+ ; this implies )( Ukk XP > )( 11 Ukk XP ++  
Similarly, using the definition of )( kk XP , it is routine to show that β+<+ UkUk XX 1 . Next, to 
show that UkX  < 1UkX + .  Suppose Ukk XX 1+≥ . This implies that 1( ( 1), 1)k kV P X k+ + +  = 
1( ( 1))a k kR P X+ +  and 1( ( ), 1)k kV P X k+ +  = 1( ( ))a k kR P X+ . This in turn implies, using (5) and (6) 
to take conditional expectation, ( ( ), )c k kR P X k  = Ra( )( kk XP ). Therefore, we have 
( ( ), )k kV P X k  = ( ( ))a k kR P X .  Since this is true for kX  > 
U
kX , it follows from our assumption 
that kX ≥  UkX 1+  that  kX ≥  UkX 1+  > UkX .                                  Q.E.D.
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Figure 1:   The  optimal sequential decision architecture 
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Figure 2:   An illustration of  ( , )kV p k  ≡  { }Max ( ), ( ), ( , )a r cR p R p R p k  
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